The use of different network security components, such as firewalls and network intrusion detection systems (NIDSs), is the dominant method to monitor and guarantee the security policy in current corporate networks. To properly configure these components, it is necessary to use several sets of security rules. Nevertheless, the existence of anomalies between those rules, particularly in distributed multi-component scenarios, is very likely to degrade the network security policy. The discovery and removal of these anomalies is a serious and complex problem to solve. In this paper, we present a complete set of mechanisms for such a management.
system, and network level. This implies cohesion of the security functions supplied by these components. In other words, security rules deployed over the different components must be consistent, not redundant and, as far as possible, optimal.
An approach based on a formal security policy refinement mechanism (using for instance abstract machines grounded on set theory and first order logic) ensures cohesion, completeness and optimization as built-in properties. Unfortunately, in most cases, such an approach has not a wide following and the policy is more often than not empirically deployed based on security administrator expertise and flair.
It is then advisable to analyze the security rules deployed to detect and correct some policy anomalies-often referred to in the literature as intra-and inter-configuration anomalies [7] . These anomalies might be the origin of security holes and/or difficulty of the intrusion prevention and detection processes. Firewalls [11] and network intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) [21] are the most commonly used security components and, in this paper, we focus particularly on their security rules.
Firewalls are prevention devices ensuring access control. They manage the traffic between the public network and the private network zones on one hand and between private zones in the local network on the other hand. Undesirable traffic is blocked or re-routed by such a component. NIDSs are detection devices ensuring a monitoring role. They are components that monitor the traffic and generate alerts in the case of suspicious traffic. The attributes used to block or to generate alerts are almost the same. The challenge, when these two kinds of components coexist in the security architecture of an information system is then to avoid inter-configuration anomalies.
In [13, 14] , we presented an audit process to manage intrafirewall policy anomalies, in order to detect and remove anomalies within the set of rules of a given firewall. This audit process is based on the existence of relationships between the condition attributes of the filtering rules-such as coincidence, disjunction, and inclusion-and proposes a transformation process which derives from an initial set of rules (potentially misconfigured) to an equivalent one which is completely free of errors. Furthermore, the resulting rules are totally disjoint, i.e., the ordering of rules is no longer relevant.
In this paper we extend our proposal for detecting and removing intra-firewall policy anomalies to a distributed setup where both firewalls and NIDSs might be in charge of the network security policy. In this way, and assuming that the role of both prevention and detection of network attacks is assigned to several components, our objective is to avoid intra and inter-component anomalies between filtering and alerting rules. The proposed approach is based on the similarity between the parameters of a filtering rule and those of an alerting rule. We can therefore check whether there are errors in those configurations regarding the policy deployment over each component which matches the same traffic.
The advantages of our approach are the following. First, as opposite to the closest related work shown in Sect. 2, our approach not only considers the analysis of relationships between rules two by two but also a complete analysis of the whole set of rules. This way, those conflicts due to the union of rules that are not detected by other proposals (such as [5, 6, 16] ) are properly discovered by our intra-and intercomponent algorithms. Second, after applying our intra-component algorithms the resulting rules of each component are totally disjoint, i.e., the ordering of rules is no longer relevant. Hence, one can perform a second rewriting of rules in a close or open manner, generating a configuration that only contains deny (or alert) rules if the component default policy is open, and accept (or pass) rules if the default policy is close (cf. Sect. 4.5) . Third, the use of a network model to determine topological properties better defines all the set of anomalies studied in the related work. Furthermore the lack of this model in other approaches, such as [5] [6] [7] , may lead to inappropriate decisions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with an analysis of some related work. Section 3 introduces a network model that is further used in Sects. 4 and 5 when presenting, respectively, our intra and inter-component anomaly classifications and algorithms. Section 6 overviews a first implementation of our proposals in order to validate its performance over real multi-component scenarios. Section 7 closes the paper giving some conclusions and further work.
Related work
A first approach to addressing our problem domain is the use of refinement mechanisms. In this way, we can perform a top-down deployment of rules by unfolding a global set of security policies into the configurations of several components and guaranteeing that those deployed configurations are free of anomalies. In [8] , for example, the authors present a refinement mechanism that uses a formal model for the generation of filtering rules by transforming general rules into specific configuration rules. Indeed, the authors propose the use of roles to better define network capabilities, and the use of an inheritance mechanism through a hierarchy of entities to automatically generate permissions and prohibitions. However, their work does not fix, from our point of view, clear semantics; and their concept of role becomes, moreover, ambiguous. A second refinement approach based on the concept of roles is presented in [17] . However, and although the authors claim that their work is based on the Role Base Access Control (RBAC) model [25] , their specification of network entities, roles, and permission assignments are not rigorous and does not fit any reality. Most of these limitations are solved in the approach presented in [15] , where a global set of rules based on the Organization Based Access Control (OrBAC) model [1] are further deployed into specific firewall configuration files through a transformation process. Unfortunately, and although we think this approach heads in the right direction, we consider that the single use of refinement mechanisms is not always enough. Generally, administrators are reluctant to set up from scratch a whole network security policy, and prefer recycling existing configurations.
A second manner to address our problem domain is through the use of automatic network support tools intended for the creation of configurations for security devices. Firewall Builder [18] , for example, provides a common interface to specify a network access control policy and then this policy is automatically translated into various firewall configuration languages, such as netfilter [27] , ipfilter [23] , or Cisco PIX [10] . Similarly, the Cisco Security Manager [12] is a commercial support tool designed to manage security policy deployments on heterogeneous networks based on Cisco devices. However, we consider that these two solutions do not offer a semantic model rich enough to express complete security policies; and, although they offer some routines for the discovery of conflicts between rules, such functionality requires the administrator's assistance and only simple redundancy that corresponds to trivial equality or inclusion between zones is detected. A more complete taxonomy of anomalies (as the one we present in this paper) should be addressed by these tools.
The closest works to ours are those of [2, [5] [6] [7] 16, 19, 28] which provide means to directly manage the discovery of anomalies from the components' configurations. The authors in [2] consider that, in a configuration set, two rules are in conflict when the first rule in order matches some packets that match the second rule, and the second rule also matches some of the packets that match the first rule. This approach is very limited since it just detects a particular case of ambiguity within a single component configuration. Furthermore, it does not provide detection in multiple-component configurations. In [16] , two cases of anomalies are considered. First, a rule R j is defined as backward redundant iff there exists another rule R i with higher priority in order such that all the packets that match rule R j also match rule R i . Second, a rule R i is defined as forward redundant iff there exists another rule R j with the same decision and less priority in order such that the following conditions hold: (1) all the packets that match R i also match R j ; (2) for each rule R k between R i and R j , and that matches all the packets that also match rule R i , R k has the same decision as R i . Although this approach seems to head in the right direction, we consider it as incomplete, since it does not detect all the possible cases of intra-component anomalies (as we do in this paper). For instance, given the following set of filtering rules (where each rule is in the form R i : condition i → decision i , being i the relative position of the rule within the set of rules, decision i a boolean expression in {accept, deny}, and condition i the condition attribute source zone-szone for short):
and since R 2 comes after R 1 , rule R 2 only applies over the interval [51, 70]-i.e., R 2 is not necessary, since, if we remove this rule from the configuration, the filtering policy does not change. The detection proposal defined in [16] cannot detect the redundancy of rule R 2 within the configuration of such a given firewall. A similar but more complete approach to detect those anomalies is presented in [19] . However, neither [16] nor [19] provide detection on multiplecomponent configurations.
The authors of [5] [6] [7] propose in their work an efficient set of algorithms to detect policy anomalies in both singleand multi-firewall configuration setups. Nonetheless, we also consider their approach as incomplete. First, their intra-and inter-component discovery approach is not complete since, given a single-or multiple-component security policy, their detection algorithms are based on the analysis of relationships between rules two by two. This way, errors due to the union of rules are not explicitly considered (as our approach does). For example, the following set of rules:
may lead their discovery algorithms to inappropriate decisions. The approach defined in [5] cannot detect that rule R 3 will never be applied due to the union of rules R 1 and R 2 . Just a correlation signal-that is obviously a weaker signal than a shadowing one-would be labeled.
Although in [6] the authors pointed out this problem, claiming that they break down the initial set of rules into an equivalent set of rules free of overlaps between rules, no specific algorithms for solving it have been provided in [5] [6] [7] . From our point of view, the proposal presented in [28] best addresses this limitation, although it also presents some limitations. For instance, giving again the following set of rules:
the proposal presented in [28] reports two partial redundancies (respectively, between rules R 1 ,R 2 ; and rules R 2 ,R 3 ), instead of the full redundancy of rule R 2 .
The inter-component discovery presented in [5] [6] [7] , moreover, considers as anomalies some situations that, from our point of view, must be tolerated to avoid inconsistent decisions between components used in the same policy to control or monitor the access to different zones. For instance, given the following scenario (where the condition attributes of both rule F W 1 {R 1 } and F W 2 {R 1 } are, respectively, (p)rotocol, (s)ource zone, (d)estination zone, and destination port-dport for short): their algorithms will inappropriately report a redundancy anomaly between filtering rules F W 1 {R 1 } and F W 2 {R 1 }. This is because rule F W 1 {R 1 } matches every packet that also F W 2 {R 1 } does. As a consequence, [5] considers rule F W 2 {R 1 } as redundant since packets denied by this rule are already denied by rule F W 1 {R 1 }. However, this conclusion is not appropriate because rule F W 1 {R 1 } applies to packets from the external zone to the private zone whereas rule F W 2 {R 1 } applies to packets from the DMZ zone to the private zone. So, rule F W 2 {R 1 } is useful and cannot be removed. Though in [5, 6] the authors claim that their analysis technique marks every rule that is used on a network path, no specific algorithms have been provided for doing so. The main advantage of our proposal over their approach is that it includes a model of the traffic which flows through each component. We consider this is necessary to draw the right conclusion in this case.
Finally, although in both [7, 28] the authors consider their work as sufficiently general to be used for verifying many other filtering based security policies such as intrusion detection and prevention systems, no specific mechanisms have been provided for doing so.
Network model and topology properties
The purpose of our network model is to determine which components within the network are traversed by a given packet, knowing its source and destination. It is defined as follows. First, and concerning the traffic flowing from two different zones of the distributed policy scenario, we may determine the set of components that are traversed by this flow. Regarding the scenario shown in Fig. 1, for Let C be a set of components and let Z be a set of zones. We assume that each pair of zones in Z are mutually disjoint, i.e., if z i ∈ Z and z j ∈ Z then z i ∩ z j = ∅. We then define the predicate connected(c 1 , c 2 ) as a symmetric and antireflexive function which becomes true when there exists, at least, one interface connecting component c 1 to component c 2 . On the other hand, we define the predicate ad jacent (c, z) as a relation between components and zones which becomes true when the zone z is interfaced to component c. Referring to Fig. 1 , we can verify that predicates connected(
, and so on, become true. We then define the set of paths, P, as follows. If c ∈ C then [c] ∈ P is an atomic path. Similarly, if [ p . c 1 ] ∈ P (be "." a concatenation functor) and c 2 ∈ C, such that c 2 / ∈ p and connected(c 1 ,
This way, we can notice that, concerning Fig. 1 ,
Let us now define a set of functions related to the order between paths. We first define functions f irst, last, and the order functor between paths. We define function f irst from P in C such that if p is a path, then f irst( p) corresponds to the first component in the path. Conversely, we define function last from P in C such that if p is a path, then last ( p) corresponds to the last component in the path. We then define the order functor between paths as p 1 ≤ p 2 , such that path p 1 is shorter than p 2 , and where all the components within p 1 are also within p 2 . We also define the predicates is Firewall (c) and is N I DS(c) which become true when the component c is, respectively, a firewall or a NIDS. 
We finally conclude by defining the predicate affects(Z , A c ) as a boolean expression which becomes true when there is, at least, an element z ∈ Z such that the configuration of z is vulnerable to the attack category A c ∈ V , where V is a vulnerability set built from a vulnerability database, such as CVE/CAN [20] or OSVDB [22] .
Intra-component classification and algorithms
In this section we present our set of intra-component audit algorithms, whose main objective is the complete discovery and removal of policy anomalies that could exist in a single component policy, i.e., to discover and warn the security officer about potential anomalies within the configuration rules of a given component.
For our work, we define the security rules of both firewalls and NIDSs as filtering and alerting rules, respectively. In turn, both filtering and alerting rules are specific cases of a more general configuration rule, which typically defines a decision (such as deny, alert, accept, or pass) that applies over a set of condition attributes, such as protocol, source zone (or szone), destination zone (or dzone), classification, and so on. We define a general configuration rule as follows:
where i is the relative position of the rule within the set of rules, {condition i } is the conjunctive set of condition attributes such that {condition i } equals A 1 ∧ A 2 ∧· · ·∧ A pbeing p the number of condition attributes of the given ruleand decision is a boolean value in {true, false}. We shall notice that, for our work, the decision of a filtering rule will be positive (true) when it applies to a specific value related to deny (or filter) the traffic it matches, and will be negative (false) when it applies to a specific value related to accept (or ignore) the traffic it matches. Similarly, the decision of an alerting rule will be positive (true) when it applies to a specific value related to alert (or warn) about the traffic it matches, and will be negative (false) when it applies to a specific value related to pass (or ignore) the traffic it matches. Intra-component shadowing A configuration rule R i is shadowed in a set of configuration rules R when such a rule never applies because all the packets that R i may match, are previously matched by another rule, or combination of rules, with higher priority. Regarding Fig. 2 , rule C 1 {R 6 } is shadowed by the overlapping of rules C 1 {R 3 } and C 1 {R 5 }. Intra-component redundancy A configuration rule R i is redundant in a set of configuration rules R when the following conditions hold: (1) R i is not shadowed by any other rule or set of rules; (2) when removing R i from R, the security policy does not change. For instance, referring to Fig. 2 , rule C 1 {R 4 } is redundant, since the overlapping between rules C 1 {R 3 } and C 1 {R 5 } is equivalent to the policy of rule C 1 {R 4 }.
Intra-component irrelevance A configuration rule R i is irrelevant in a set of configuration rules R if one of the following conditions holds:
(1) Both source and destination addresses are within the same zone. For instance, rule C 1 {R 1 } is irrelevant since the source of this address, external networ k, as well as its destination, is the same. (2) The component is not within the minimal route that connects the source zone, concerning the irrelevant rule which causes the anomaly, to the destination zone. Hence, the rule is irrelevant since it matches traffic which does not flow through this component. Rule C 1 {R 2 }, for example, is irrelevant since component C 1 is not in the path which corresponds to the minimal route between the source zone uni x networ k to the destination zone windows networ k. (3) The component is a NIDSs, i.e., the predicate is N I DS(c) (cf. Sect. 3) becomes true, and, at least, one of the condition attributes in R i is related with a classification of attack A c which does not affect the destination zone of such a rule-i.e., the predicate affects (z d , A c ) becomes f alse. Regarding Fig. 2 , we can see that rule C 2 {R 2 } is irrelevant since the nodes in the destination zone uni x networ k are not affected by vulnerabilities classified as winwor m.
Intra-component Algorithms
Our proposed audit process is a way of alerting the security officer in charge of the network about these configuration errors, as well as to remove all the useless rules in the initial firewall configuration. The data to be used for the detection process is the following. A set of rules R as a list of initial size n, where n equals count (R), and where each element is an associative array with the strings condition, decision, shadowing, redundancy, and irrelevance as keys to access each necessary value. For reasons of clarity, we assume one can access a linkedlist through the operator R i , where i is the relative position regarding the initial list size-count (R). We also assume one can add new values to the list as any other normal variable does (element ← value), as well as remove elements through the addition of an empty set (element ← ∅). The internal order of elements from the linked-list R keeps with the relative ordering of rules.
Each element R i [condition] is a boolean expression over p possible attributes. To simplify, we only consider the following attributes: szone (source zone), dzone (destination zone), sport (source port), dport (destination port), pr otocol, and attack_class-or A c for short-which will be empty when the component is a firewall. In turn, each ele- [irrelevance] are boolean variables in {true, f alse}-which will be initialized to f alse by default.
We split the whole process into four different algorithms. The second algorithm (cf. Algorithm 2) is a boolean function in {true, f alse} which applies the necessary verifications to decide whether a rule r is irrelevant for the configuration of a component c. To properly execute such an algorithm, let us define source(r ) as a function in Z such that source(r ) = szone, and dest (r ) as a function in Z such that dest (r ) = dzone.
The third algorithm (cf. Algorithm 3) is a boolean function in {true, f alse} which, in turn, applies the transformation exclusion (cf. Algorithm 1) over a set of configuration rules to check whether the rule obtained as a parameter is potentially redundant.
The last algorithm (cf. Algorithm 4) performs the whole process of detecting and removing the complete set of intracomponent anomalies. This process is split into three different phases. During the first phase, a set of shadowing rules are detected and removed from a top-bottom scope, by iteratively applying Algorithm 1-when the decision field of the two rules is different. Let us notice that this stage of detecting and removing shadowed rules is applied before the detection and removal of proper redundant and irrelevant rules.
The resulting set of rules is then used when applying the second phase, also from a top-bottom scope. This stage is performed to detect and remove proper redundant rules, through an iterative call to Algorithm 3 (i.e., testRedundancy), as well as to detect and remove all the further shadowed rules remaining during the latter process. Finally, during a third phase the whole set of non-empty rules is analyzed in order to detect and remove irrelevance, through an iterative call to Algorithm 2 (i.e., testIrrelevance).
We give in the following sections an outlook on applying these four algorithms over some representative examples, as well as a proof of their correctness, and an analysis of their complexity.
Applying the Intra-component Algorithms
Let us start this section by showing how can we apply function exclusion (Algorithm 1) over a set of two rules R i and R j , each one of them with two condition attributes (szone and dzone), and where R j has less priority than R i .
In this first example,
since (szone ∈ [1, 50]) ∩ (szone ∈ [80, 100]) = ∅, the condition attributes of rules R i and R j are completely independent. Thus, the applying of
The following three examples show the same execution over a set of condition attributes with different cases of conflict. A first case is the following:
where there is a main overlap of attribute szone from R i [ 
there are two simple overlaps of both attributes szone and
A more complete example is the following,
where
Regarding a full exclusion, let us show the following example,
where the set of condition attributes of rule R i completely excludes the ones of rule R j . Then, applying exclusion (R j , R i ) returns an empty set (i.e., {∅, ∅} = ∅). Hence, on a further execution of Algorithm 4 (and assuming that the decision field of both rules were different) the shadowing field of rule R j (initialized as f alse by default) would become true (i.e., R j [shadowing] ← true).
In order to show the execution of Algorithm 4 over a more complete set of rules, we sketch such an execution over the following set of rules:
We start by showing the initial step within the first phase of Algorithm 4, where i = 1, and applied over the previous set of filtering rules. Let us notice that on this first step, the execution of function exclusion, with rules R 2 and R 1 , since their decision is different, becomes the range [51, 90]. Similarly, the execution of function exclusion, with rules R 5 and R 1 becomes the range { [1, 9] , [51, 70]}. The result of this first step is the following:
Let us now move to the second step, with i = 2. In this step, the range of rule R 4 decreases since the execution of function exclusion, with rules R 2 and R 4 , whose decision is different, becomes the range [30, 50]:
At the end of the first phase, once executed both third and fourth steps, the resulting rules remain as above:
Once the first phase is finished and running over the first step of the second phase, i.e., i equals 1, we notice that: (1) the result of applying function testRedundancy with rule R 1 as the second parameter becomes f alse; (2) the execution of function exclusion, with rules R 4 and R 1 , completely excludes the condition attribute of rule R 4 . Hence, rule R 4 , is reported as shadowed by the combination of rules R 1 and R 2 , and its condition attribute becomes an empty set. Therefore, the status field shadowing of rule R 4 , i.e., R 4 [shadowing], switches its value to true:
Then, we proceed to the second step of the second phase, i.e., i equals 2, and notice that rule R 2 disappears since the result of applying function testRedundancy with rule R 2 as the second parameter becomes true. Thus, the condition attribute of rule R 2 becomes an empty set, and its status field redundancy, i.e., R 2 [redundancy], switches its value to true: We do not show the rest of the execution, since the resulting set of filtering rules does not modify the previous one, which is the following:
Let us recall that the following two warnings will notify the security officer of the discovery of both shadowing and redundancy anomalies, in order to verify the correctness of the whole detection and transformation process:
Shadowing on R 4 with R 2 ,R 1 Redundancy on R 2 with R 3 ,R 5 To conclude this section, let us finally show the warnings reported when executing Algorithm 4 over the configuration of the two components we showed in Fig. 2 .
First case of irrelevance on
C 1 {R 1 } Second case of irrelevance on C 1 {R 2 } Redundancy on C 1 {R 4 } with C 1 {R 3 },C 1 {R 5 } Shadowing on C 1 {R 6 } with C 1 {R 3 },C 1 {R 5 } Third case of irrelevance on C 2 {R 2 }
Correctness of the intra-component algorithms
Lemma 1 Let R i : {condition i } → decision i and R j : {condition j }→decision j be two configuration rules. Then
Proof Let us assume that
Hence, to prove the equivalence between {R i , R j } and {R i , R j } is trivial in this case.
Let us now assume that
If we apply rules {R i , R j } where R i comes before R j , then rule R j applies to a given packet if this packet satis-
which corresponds to R j = exclusion(R j , R i ). This way, if R j applies to a given packet in {R i , R j }, then rule R j also applies to this packet in {R i , R j }. Conversely, if R j applies to a given packet in {R i , R j }, then this means this packet satisfies R j [condition] but not R i [condition] . So, it is clear that rule R j also applies to this packet in
, this enables us to conclude that {R i , R j } is equivalent to {R i , R j }. Since Tr 1 (R) is derived from rule R by applying exclusion(R j , R i ) to some rules R j in R, it is straightforward, from Lemma 1, to conclude that Tr 1 (R) is equivalent to R.
Theorem 1 Let R be a set of configuration rules and let
Let us now move to the second phase, and let us consider a rule R i such that test Redundancy(R i ) (cf. Algorithm 3) is true. This means that R i [condition] can be derived by conditions of a set of rules S with the same decision and that come after in order than rule R i .
Since every rule R j with a decision different from the one of rules in S has already been excluded from rules of S in the first phase of the algorithm, we can conclude that rule R i is definitely redundant and can be removed without changing the component configuration.
This way, we conclude that Algorithm 4 preserves equivalence in this case.
On the other hand, if test Redundancy(R i ) is f alse, then the transformation consists in applying function exclusion (R j , R i ) to some rules R j which also preserves equivalence. Similarly, and once in the third phase, let us consider a rule R i such that test I rrelevance(c, R i ) is true. This means that this rule matches traffic that will never traverse component c, or that it is irrelevant for the component's configuration. So, we can remove R i from R without changing such a configuration.
Thus, in this third case, as in the other two cases, T r (R) is equivalent to T r 1 (R) which, in turn, is equivalent to R. Proof For any pair of rules R i and R j such that R i comes before R j , R j is replaced by a rule R j obtained by recursively replacing R j by exclusion(R j , R k ) for any k < j.
Lemma 2
Then, by recursively applying Lemma 2, it is possible to commute rules R i and R j in T r(R) without changing the policy.
Regarding the second statement-Tr(R) is completely free of anomalies-notice that, in T r(R), each rule is independent of all other rules.
Thus, if we consider a rule R i in T r(R) such that R i [condition] = ∅, then this rule will apply to any packet that satisfies R i [condition], i.e., it is not shadowed.
On the other hand, rule R i is not redundant because if we remove this rule, since this rule is the only one that applies to packets that satisfy R i [condition] , then configuration of the component will change if we remove rule R i from Tr(R).
Finally, and after the execution of Algorithm 4 over the initial set of configuration rules, one may verify that for each rule R i in Tr(R) the following conditions hold:
Thus, each rule R i in T r(R)
is not irrelevant.
Complexity of the intra-component algorithms
Let us discuss in this section the degree of computational complexity of our approach's main algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 1, with respect to the increase of the initial number of rules due to the whole rewriting process of Algorithm 4. Indeed, in a worst case scenario (e.g., Fig. 3b ), Algorithm 1 may generate a huge number of rules due to the exclusion routine defined by Algorithm 1. For instance, if we have two rules with p attributes, the second rule can be replaced by p new rules in the worst case, leading to p + 1 rules.
If we now assume that we have n rules (n > 2) with p attributes, then each rule except the first one can be replaced by p new rules in the first rewriting step of the algorithm. In the second step, the p rules that replace the second rule are combined with the p rules that replace rules 3 to n. Thus, each rule from 3 to n can be replaced by p 2 new rules. In the third step, the p 2 rules corresponding to rule 3 are combined with the p 2 rules corresponding to rules 4 to n. We can show that this may lead to p 3 new rules. And so on. Hence, in the worst case, if we have n rules (n > 2) with p attributes, then we can obtain 1 + p + p 2 + · · · + p n−1 rules when applying Algorithm 1 from Algorithm 4, that is p n −1 p−1 rules. Although this complexity seems very high, in all the experiments we have done (cf. Sect. 6), we were always very far from this case. First, because only attributes szone and dzone may significantly overlap and exert a bad influence on our algorithm's complexity. Other attributes, such as protocol, sport, and/or dport, are generally equal or completely different when combin-ing configuration rules. Second, administrators generally use overlapping rules in their configurations to represent rules that may have exceptions [4] . This situation is closer to the normal case presented in Fig. 3a than to the worst case scenario shown in Fig. 3b . Third, when anomalies are detected by our algorithms, some rules are removedwhich significantly reduces the theoretical complexity.
Default policies
We assume in our work that each component implements a positive (i.e., close) or negative (i.e., open) policy. If it is positive, the default decision is to alert or to deny a packet when any configuration rule applies. By contrast, the negative policy will accept or pass a packet when no rule applies.
After rewriting the rules with our intra-component-audit algorithms, we can actually remove every rule whose decision is pass or accept if the policy of this component is negative (since this rule is redundant with the default policy); and similarly we can remove every rule whose decision is deny or alert if its policy is positive. Thus, we can consider that our proposed intra-component-audit algorithm generates a configuration that only contains positive rules if the component default policy is negative, and negative rules if the default policy is positive.
Inter-component classification and algorithms
The objective of the inter-component audit algorithms is the complete detection of policy anomalies that could exist in a multi-component policy, i.e., to discover and warn the security officer about potential anomalies between policies of different components.
The main hypotheses for applying our inter-component algorithms assume the following: 1. An upstream traffic flows away from the closest component to the origin of this traffic (i.e., the most-upstream component [6] ) towards the closest component to the remote destination (i.e., the most-downstream component [6] ); 2. Every component's policy in the network has been rewritten using the intra-component algorithms defined in Sect. 4, i.e., it does not contain intra-component anomalies and the rules within such a policy are completely independent between them.
Inter-component anomalies classification
In this section, we classify the complete set of anomalies that can occur within a multi-component policy. Our classification is based on the network model presented in Sect.
3. An example for each anomaly is illustrated through the distributed multi-component policy setup shown in Fig. 4 .
Inter-component shadowing A shadowing anomaly occurs between two components when the following conditions hold: (1) The most-upstream component is a firewall; (2) The downstream component, where the anomaly is detected, does not block or report (completely or partially) traffic that is blocked (explicitly, by means of positive rules; or implic- Fig. 4 Example of a distributed network security policy setup itly, by means of its default policy), by the most-upstream component.
The explicit shadowing as result of the union of rules C 6 {R 7 } and C 6 {R 8 } to the traffic that the component C 3 matches by means of rule C 3 {R 1 } is a proper example of full shadowing between a firewall and a NIDS. Similarly, the anomaly between C 3 {R 2 } and C 6 {R 8 } shows an example of an explicit partial shadowing anomaly between a firewall and a NIDS.
On the other hand, the implicit shadowing between the rule C 1 {R 5 } and the default policy of component C 2 is a proper example of implicit full shadowing between two firewalls. Finally, the anomaly between the rule C 1 {R 6 }, C 2 {R 1 }, and the default policy of component C 2 shows an example of an implicit partial shadowing anomaly between two firewalls.
Inter-component redundancy A redundancy anomaly occurs between two components when the following conditions hold: (1) The most-upstream component is a firewall; (2) The downstream component, where the anomaly is detected, blocks or reports (completely or partially) traffic that is blocked by the most-upstream component.
A proper example of full redundancy between two firewalls is shown by rules C 5 {R 3 } and C 6 {R 1 }; rules C 4 {R 3 } and C 6 {R 5 }, on the other hand, show an example of full redundancy between a firewall and a NIDS. Similarly, rules C 5 {R 4 } and C 6 {R 2 } show a proper example of partial redundancy between two firewalls, whereas rules C 4 {R 4 } and C 6 {R 6 } show an example of partial redundancy between a firewall and a NIDS.
Although this kind of redundancy is expressly introduced by network administrators sometimes (e.g., to guarantee the forbidden traffic will not reach the destination), it is important to discover it since, if such a rule is applied, we may conclude that at least one of the redundant components is working wrongly. For that reason, our proposal does not advise the administrator to remove the redundant rule from the set of rules; but it advises the administrator to give a different meaning to that rule-by adding, for instance, an extra attribute to the rule (e.g., a log attribute pointing out to such a situation).
Inter-component misconnection A misconnection anomaly occurs between two components when the most-upstream component is a firewall that permits (explicitly, by means of negative rules; or implicitly, through its default policy) all the traffic-or just a part of it-that is then denied by a downstream firewall. For example, we have a full explicit misconnection between firewalls C 5 and C 2 due to rules C 5 {R 1 } and C 2 {R 2 } (full misconnection); and a partial explicit misconnection due to rules C 5 {R 2 } and C 2 {R 2 }. Similarly, we can observe a full implicit misconnection anomaly between firewalls C 1 and C 2 due to rule C 2 {R 3 } and the default policy of firewall C 1 ; and a partial implicit misconnection anomaly due to rules C 1 {R 6 } and C 2 {R 1 }, together with the default policy of C 2 .
Inter-component analysis algorithms
For reasons of clarity, we split the whole analysis process into four different algorithms. The input for the first algorithm (cf. Algorithm 5) is the set of components C, such that for all c ∈ C, we note c[rules] as the set of configuration rules of component c, and c[ policy] ∈ {true, f alse} as the default policy of such a component c.
In turn, each rule r ∈ c[rules] consists of a conjunctive set of condition attributes (i.e., szone, dzone, sport, dport, pr otocol, etc.) pointing out to a decision over the values true or f alse.
Let us recall here the functions source(r ) = szone and dest (r ) = dzone. Thus, we compute for each component c ∈ C and for each rule r ∈ c[rules], each one of the source zones z 1 ∈ Z s and destination zones z 2 ∈ Z d -whose intersection with respectively szone and dzone is not emptywhich become, together with a reference to each component c and each rule r , the input for the second algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 6).
Once in Algorithm 6, we compute the minimal route of components that connects zone z 1 to z 2 , i.e., z 2 ) . Then, we decompose the set of components inside each path in downstream path ( path d ) and upstream path ( path u ). To do so, we use functions head and tail (defined below). The first component c d ∈ path d , and the last component c u ∈ path u are passed, respectively, as argument to the last two algorithms (i.e., Algorithms 7 and 8) in order to conclude the set of necessary checks that guarantee the audit process.
Some other operators and routines called from these algorithms are the following: (1) operator " ", which denotes that two rules r i and r j are correlated if every attribute in R i has a non-empty intersection with the corresponding attribute in R j ; (2) routine tail(c i , path), which returns the downstream path cointaining those components c j ∈ path placed just after component c i ; (3) routine head(c i , path) , which returns the upstream path of components c j ∈ path which are placed just before component c i ; and (4) routine f irst Firewall( path), which returns the first component c i ∈ path such that predicate is Firewall(c i ) becomes true.
Let us conclude this section by giving in Fig. 5 an outlook to the set of warnings sent to the security officer after the execution of Algorithm 5 in the scenario of Fig. 4 .
Correctness of the inter-component algorithms
To prove the correctness of our inter-component algorithms, we first define what is a deployment of configuration rules without anomalies. For this purpose, let us consider a set R of configuration rules to be deployed over a set C of components that partitions a network into a set Z of zones. We assume that the set of rules R has been rewritten by Algorithm 9 into Tr(R), which, in turn, is equivalent to R, but completely free of any possible relation between rules of the same type (e.g., filtering or alerting rules).
Algorithm 9 is a simplified version of Algorithm 4. It automatically fixes any dependency between rules of the same type (e.g., filtering or alerting rules). Like Algorithm 4, the rewriting process defined in Algorithm 9 relies on a iterative execution of the auxiliary function exclusion defined in Algorithm 1 (cf. Sect. 4). Therefore, similar reasonings as used to prove the correctness of Algorithm 4 allow us to prove the correctness of Algorithm 9.
Let us now consider a rule r ∈ Tr(R) and let us assume that r applies to a source zone z 1 and a destination zone z 2 , i.e., szone = z 1 ∩ source(r ) = ∅ and dzone = z 2 ∩ dest (r ) = ∅. Let r be a rule identical to r except that source(r ) = szone and dest (r ) = dzone. Let us also assume that z 2 ) . We then define our deployment principle as follows.
Definition 1 Any rule r ∈ T r(R) will be deployed over the set C of components. There are two different cases:
If r [decision] = " f alse" then, on every component on the minimal route from source szone to destination dzone, deploy a negative rule r (i.e., an accept filtering rule r if the component is a firewall, or a pass alerting rule r if the component is a NIDS).
Conversely, if r [decision] = "true", then the two following possibilities hold:
(1) if r is a filtering rule, then deploy a deny filtering rule r on the most-upstream firewall of the minimal route (if such a firewall does not exist, then generate a deployment error message); (2) if r is an alerting rule, then deploy an alert rule r on the first NIDS located before the most-upstream firewall of the minimal route (if such a NIDS does not exist, then generate a deployment error message).
Having defined our deployment principle, let us now consider the aggregation process shown in Algorithm 10, which is intended for the aggregation of configurations rules from a set of components C into a global set of rules R. (An earlier version of this algorithm is presented in [3] .) The input data of our aggregation process are the set C of components whose configurations we want to fold up. As we can notice in line 3 of Algorithm 10, the configuration of each component c i ∈ C if first fixed by applying the intra-component-audit algorithm presented in Sect. 4 .
The gathering of configuration rules is according to the deployment principle stated in Definition 1. In this way, for each negative rule configured in a component, we expect to find an open flow of permissions within every component in the minimal route from the source zone to the destination zone of such a rule. Otherwise, an aggregation error message is generated. On the other hand, for each positive rule, if it is a filtering rule, we expect to find such a prohibition on the first firewall of the minimal route from the source zone to the destination zone; otherwise, an aggregation error message is generated; if such a rule is an alerting rule, we expect to not find an upstream firewall on the minimal route from the source zone to the destination zone blocking its traffic; otherwise, an aggregation error message is generated.
Based on the deployment and aggregation processes defined above, we can now prove the following theorem: Proof Let C be a set of components that partitions the network into a set Z of zones, and whose component configurations are aggregated into R by applying Algorithm 10.
Let us first prove that if there exists, at least, one rule r i ∈ C[rules] such that it presents an inter-component anomaly (as defined in Sect. 5.1), then the aggregation of rules R ← aggregation(C) through the use of Algorithm 10 does not generate a consistent set of rules R that can be further deployed over the network by using the deployment principle stated in Definition 1.
For instance, let us assume that r i ∈ C[rules] presents an inter-component shadowing. If so, r i is a negative rule (i.e., either accept or pass) that applies to a source zone z 1 and a destination zone z 2 such that szone = z 1 ∩ source(r i ) = ∅, dzone = z 2 ∩ dest (r i ) = ∅; r i belongs to a component C i ∈ C which is in the path
and it exists at least one component C j such that the following conditions hold: (1) component C j is an upstream firewall, i.e., C j ∈ head(C i , M R(z 1 , z 2 ))∧ is Firewall(C j )= true; (2) component C j explicitly or implicitly blocks the traffic that r i matches, i.e., either there exists a rule r j ∈ C j [rules] such that r j r i ∧ r j [decision] = "true"; or
If this situation applies, we can observe that during the aggregation process specified by Algorithm 10, rule r i matches statement 10 , i.e., r i [decision]= "f alse becomes true. Then, the process analyzes through statements 12-18 whether there exists at least an upstream firewall C j such that it blocks the traffic that r i also matches, i.e., it does not contain negative filtering rules accepting that traffic (statement 14 becomes true) and either it explicitly blocks that traffic through a positive filtering rule (first condition of statement 16 becomes true), or it implicitly blocks that traffic through its default policy (second condition of statement 16 becomes true). If so, the process finishes with an error and returns an empty set of rules (cf. statements 17 and 18).
Let us now assume that r i ∈ C[rules] presents an intercomponent redundancy. If so, r i is a positive rule (i.e., either deny or alert) that applies to a source zone z 1 and a destination zone z 2 (such that szone = z 1 ∩ source(r i ) = ∅, dzone = z 2 ∩ dest (r i ) = ∅); r i belongs to a component C i ∈ C which is in the path
and one of the following conditions hold: (1) component C i is a firewall and there exists, at least, an upstream firewall C j that either explicitly or implicitly blocks the traffic that r i already blocks (without justifying r i such a redundancy by means of an additional attribute like, for example, an attribute for logs); (2) component C i is a NIDS located after an upstream firewall on the minimal route which blocks the traffic of r i (without justifying r i such a redundancy by means of an additional attribute like, for example, an attribute for logs). If condition (1) of this situation applies, we can observe that during the folding process specified by Algorithm 10, rule r i matches statement 19, i.e., r i [decision] = "true" becomes true, and the two conditions of statement 20, i.e., r i is placed within a firewall and such a firewall is not the most-upstream component of the minimal route from z 1 to z 2 . Thus, the process finishes with an error and returns an empty set of rules (cf. statements 21 and 22) .
Similarly, if condition (2) of this situation applies, we can observe that during the folding process specified by Algorithm 10 rule r i matches both statement 19, i.e., r i [decision] ="true", and statement 23, i.e., predicate is N I DS(C i ) = true. Then, the process analyzes through statements 25 -31 whether there exists at least an upstream firewall C j that blocks the traffic that r i also matches, i.e., it does not contain negative filtering rules accepting that traffic (statement 27 becomes true) and either it explicitly blocks that traffic through a positive filtering rule (first condition of statement 29 becomes true), or it implicitly blocks that traffic through its default policy (second condition of statement 29 becomes true). If so, the process finishes with an error and returns an empty set of rules (cf. statements 30 and 31).
Let us finally assume that r i ∈ C[rules] presents an intercomponent misconnection. If so, r i is a positive filtering rule (i.e., deny) that applies to a source zone z 1 and a destination zone z 2 such that szone z 2 ) ; and there exists, at least, an upstream firewall C j that either explicitly or implicitly accepts the traffic that r i blocks. In order to avoid this situation it suffices to detect whether firewall C i is not the most-upstream firewall. As we have shown in the previous case, this situation is handled by the aggregation process specified by Algorithm 10 through statement 19 and the two conditions of statement 20. So, if r i is placed within a firewall and such a firewall is not the most-upstream component of the minimal route from z 1 to z 2 , the aggregation process finishes with an error and returns an empty set of rules (cf. statements 30 and 31).
It is straightforward, then, to conclude that when no inter-component anomalies apply to the set of component configurations C[rules], the aggregating process specified by Algorithm 10 returns a global set of filtering rules R with the union of all the configuration rules (cf. statements 32-35 of Algorithm 10) previously deployed over the set of components C.
Let us notice that we apply in line 36 of Algorithm 10 the rewriting process defined in Algorithm 9. In this way, we can guarantee that there are no dependencies between rules of the same type (i.e., alerting and filtering rules) in the set of rules aggregated during the folding process of Algorithm 10. As stated above, and similarly to Algorithm 4 (cf. Sect. 4), Algorithm 9 relies on a iterative execution of the auxiliary function exclusion defined in Algorithm 1 (cf. Sect. 4). Therefore, similar reasonings as used to prove the correctness of Algorithm 4 (cf. Sect. 4.3) enables us to prove that the set of rules returned by Algorithm 10 is free of intra-component anomalies.
If we now deploy the set of rules R obtained from Algorithm 10 by using the deployment principle stated in Definition 1, and since we agree that R belongs to a set of configuration rules C[rules] that is free of intercomponent anomalies, we can then guarantee that the deployed set of configurations is also free of inter-component anomalies, i.e., the audit process of Algorithm 5 does not detect any inter-component anomaly in the configurations already deployed.
Implementation and performance evaluation
We implemented the complete set of algorithms and processes presented in this paper in a software prototype called MIRAGE (which stands for MIsconfiguRAtion manaGEr). MIRAGE has been developed using PHP, a general purpose scripting language that is especially suited for web services development and can be embedded into HTML for the construction of client-side GUI based applications [9] . MIRAGE can be locally or remotely executed by using a HTTP server (e.g., Apache server over UNIX or Windows setups) and a web browser. The user interface of MIRAGE not only allows the whole management of those processes described in this paper, but also the management of the network properties described in Sect. 3. In order to do so, MIRAGE extracts such information from SKYBOX [26] , an automatic network tool that allows us to properly manage the set of components, the set of configurations rules of each component, the set of zones of the system, and so on. In fact, both the network properties and the whole policies are derived from-and represented into-SKYBOX-based XML files. We show in Fig. 6 some screenshots of the graphical environment of MIRAGE. We first see in Fig. 6a the main interface of our tool. The top-left panel allows the load of SKYBOX-based XML files, from which one can supply the topology of the system and the set of security rules already deployed over the network from a single XML file based on SKYBOX. Through a set of transformations, MIRAGE derives the specific instances of the network model described in Sect. 3, and remains ready to perform the complete set of processes defined in this paper. Figure 6 also shows some other options placed in its middle panel, such as the selection of components, and buttons to call its main functions/routines, which are the following: (1) intra-component analysis of rules; (2) inter-component analysis of rules; (3) aggregation of existing rules into a single global policy; (4) deployment of the resulting global set of rules into a different set of components. These four procedures can work in two different modes: (a) results mode, which is a quick mode that only reports warnings and proper results of a given process; (b) logs mode, which is a more detailed mode that not only reports warnings and results, but also those information generated and exchanged between functions during the whole execution of a given process.
We can see in Fig. 6b the output view of MIRAGE when performing the intra-component audit process to the set of rules of a given component. In this case, the set of filtering rules of a firewall are analyzed, and two intra-component anomalies are detected. Furthermore, the prototype leaves the option to the administrator to fix those anomalies by updating the network model. Similarly, we can see in Fig. 6c the result of applying our inter-component audit process to the complete set of components' rules. Finally, we show in Fig. 6d -f the output view after applying, respectively, the aggregation and deploying processes defined in Sect. 5.3.
In the following section, we show some experimental results carried out by using the graphical user interface of MIRAGE.
Performance evaluation
We evaluated the implementation of MIRAGE through a set of experiments over different IPv4-based security components and networks, and through the use of the results mode of its four main routines. The experiments were carried out on an Intel-Pentium M 1.4 GHz processor with 512 MB RAM, running Debian GNU/Linux 2.6, and using Apache/1.3 with PHP/4.3 configured. We did not measure in our evaluations the performance for parsing and constructing the topological descriptions derived from the XML files loaded into MIRAGE. This process was performed just once at the beginning of each evaluation, and we do not consider it as relevant.
We first evaluated the performance of our intra-component audit algorithms by analyzing the average time and memory space utilized when processing different set of security rules for three different components. We created the configuration of each component based on the security policy characteristics of our real institutional network. More specifically, the set of components utilized for this first evaluation consisted of two firewalls based on netfilter [27] and ipfilter [23] , and a NIDS based on snort [24] .
Each component was configured towards three different zones with more than 50 hosts in each zone. The configuration rules of those components consisted of the following main attribute fields: source IP address, destination IP address, source port number, destination port number, and protocol type. The configuration rules of the NIDS included, moreover, two additional values to take into account, the payload and the attack classification associated to each rule. Figure 7a shows the average execution times (in seconds) for performing the intra-component analysis of those three components versus the total number of rules of their configurations. Three different curves are shown, one for each of the following cases: (1) netfilter firewall rules, of which 15% presented overlaps between their attributes; (2) ipfilter firewall rules, of which 75% presented overlaps between their attributes; and (3) snort-based alerting rules, of which 90% presented overlaps between their attributes. The horizontal axis indicates the total number of rules and the vertical axis indicates the average process time. Similarly, Fig. 7b indicates the associated space memory consumption during the same executions, where its horizontal axis indicates the total number of rules and its vertical axis the memory space consumption (in kilobytes).
As expected, according to the complexity analyzed in Sect. 4.4, the first case scenario showed the least processing time and memory space consumption (it took less than (it took more than 15 s and almost 150 kilobytes of memory for the analysis of 70 rules with 90% of overlaps). We can notice, however, that even if the theoretical complexity of the third case should bound close to O( p n ), where p is the number of attributes, and n the number of rules, we were far from this complexity, and our implementation scaled well with the increase of rules. We further verified that although the complexity of Algorithm 4 is determined by the complexity of splitting rules, the dynamic removal of anomalies, and the distribution of overlaps between rule attributes, significantly reduces the execution complexity.
We measured, in a second phase of our evaluations, the average time and memory space consumption when processing our inter-component audit algorithms through a progressive increment of security rules, components and networks. The configuration of every component was previously analyzed with our intra-component audit process, and any possible anomaly and/or overlap between rule attributes was previously removed.
The results of these measurements are plotted in Fig. 8a and b as three different curves, according to the three following topologies: (1) two subnetworks with two firewalls and one NIDS; (2) four subnetworks with three firewalls and two NIDSs; and (3) six subnetworks with four firewalls and two NIDSs. These same three topologies were also utilized for measuring the average time and memory space when performing the aggregation process defined in Sect. 5.3. The results of these last measurements are plotted in Figs. 9a and b, respectively.
From Figs. 8a and b we see that it took less than 2 s and 200 kilobytes of memory for the analysis of 70 security rules distributed between three components and two subnetworks; and almost 5 s and 260 kilobytes of memory for the analysis of the same number of rules distributed between six components and six subnetworks. The analysis of those same scenarios, but through the aggregation process specified in Sect. 5.3 increased both processing time and memory space consumption. More specifically, it took almost 7 s and 310 kilobytes of memory the aggregation of the 70 security rules distributed between six components and six subnetworks. We consider this increase reasonable, since it is due to the rewriting of policies performed at the beginning and ending stages of the aggregation process-specified in lines 3 and 36 of Algorithm 10.
Clearly, the results presented in this section indicate strong requirements of both processing time and space memory. However, we consider that these requirements are acceptable considering that all our approaches are performed off-line and they do not affect the performance of any component or network. Furthermore, we want to recall that the implementation of our proposal has been done by using a high level scripting language. We expect that the use of a more efficient language will considerably improve these results.
Conclusions
We presented in this paper a set of mechanisms for the managing of anomalies on distributed network security policies. More precisely, our proposal is intended for the discovery of anomalies in network security policies deployed over f irewalls and network intrusion detection systems (NIDSs). Our approach was presented in two main blocks. We first presented, in Sect. 4, a set of algorithms for the management of anomalies within the configuration of single security components. We then presented, in Sect. 5, a set of algorithms for the management of anomalies between the configuration of different security components implementing a single, but distributed, security policy.
The advantages of our proposal are the following. First, our intra-component transformation process verifies that the resulting rules are completely independent between them. Otherwise, each rule considered as useless during the process is reported to the security officer, in order to verify the correctness of the whole process. Second, we can perform a second rewriting of rules, generating a configuration that only contains positive rules if the component default policy is negative, and negative rules if the default policy is positive. Third, the network model presented in Sect. 3 allows us to determine which components are crossed by a given packet knowing its source and destination, as well as other network properties. Thanks to this model, our approach better defines all the set of anomalies studied in the related work, and it reports, moreover, two new anomalies (irrelevance and misconnection) not reported, as defined in our work, in none of the other approaches.
The implementation of our approach in a software prototype, moreover, demonstrates the applicability of our work. We discussed this implementation, based on a scripting language [9] , and presented an evaluation of its performance. Although the results of our experiments showed strong processing time and memory space requirements, we consider them reasonable and expect that the use of a more efficient implementation language will improve our initial evaluation.
As further work, we are currently working on an extension of our proposals in the case where the security architecture will also include virtual private network (VPN) tunnels and IPv6 devices, as well as those scenarios where there exist a cooperation between routing and tunneling policies. In parallel to this work, we are also studying how to extend our approach to the analysis of stateful policies.
